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This study examines whether prior CEO acquisition experience at other firms is associated with 
subsequent merger performance. First, using both the original and extended sample period, we 
replicate and confirm the results of Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) and find that independent directors’ 
prior merger experience improves succeeding acquisition performance. Second, we extend their 
study by considering the effect of prior CEO acquisition experience. Similar to the effect for 
independent directors, we find that prior CEO acquisition experience improves performance in 
later takeovers. Consistent with CEO learning, we document a greater effect on subsequent 
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The main objective of this study is to replicate and extend Field and Mkrtchyan (2017), who find that 
independent directors at bidding firms with prior merger and acquisition (M&A) experience at other 
firms engage in more value creating M&As. We extend Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) by expanding their 
analysis to chief executive officers (i.e., “CEOs”). We contend that CEOs arguably play an equal or 
more important role in decision making during M&As than independent directors. Therefore, we 
examine whether CEOs’ prior acquisition experience at other firms leads to higher acquisition 
announcement returns. Furthermore, Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) find that the quality of prior 
acquisition experience matters: with bidding firms earning higher announcement returns when the past 
acquisitions completed by independent directors on the board are positive. We extend this analysis to 
the CEO of acquiring firms and expect that announcement returns will be higher when the CEO has 
better prior acquisition performance. 
Prior research acknowledges that independent directors play an important role during M&As, as they 
are expected to advise and monitor the CEO and increase corporate value and efficiency (Bhagat and 
Black 2002; Schmidt 2015). While the independent directors’ role is vital in the acquisition process to 
moderate managerial power and attempt to neutralise CEOs’ self-serving motives, CEOs also have a 
crucial role in the M&A process. For instance, the CEO is likely to be the main instigator of M&A 
deals and take the primary role in deal negotiation (Adams et al., 2005). Moreover, Graham et al., 
(2013) argue that CEOs are less likely to share or delegate decision-making responsibility in mergers 
and acquisitions relative to other firm decisions.  Consistent with prior experience enabling individuals 
to be effective at complex problem solving and decision making (McDonald et al., 2008), Field and 
Mkrtchyan (2017) document that acquiring firm independent directors’ prior acquisition experience 
leads to better subsequent acquisition outcomes. Whilst prior studies have examined how CEOs’ 
attributes such as age and overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Yim 2013) have an effect on 
their acquisition performance and outcomes, it is surprising that the effect of a CEO’s prior acquisition 
experience on subsequent acquisition performance has not been addressed. 
Earlier research also documents that the quality of prior acquisition experience matters, since directors 
with prior M&A experience possess more fully developed capabilities for identifying promising 
acquisitions and avoiding problematic ones (McDonald et al., 2008). Importantly, Field and Mkrtchyan 
(2017) find that prior M&A performance actually represents directors’ ability, as independent directors 
whose prior acquisition experience is positive generate higher announcement returns at subsequent 
3 
 
acquisitions. As highlighted above, we argue that the CEO has the greatest responsibility in relation to 
an acquisition. We thus build upon, and extend, the findings of Field and Mkrtchyan (2017), and 
examine if acquiring firms with CEOs with better performing prior acquisition experience engage in 
higher performing acquisitions. 
Consistent with the findings in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) we find that bidding firms with 
independent directors with prior M&A experience engage in more value increasing M&As. 
Similarly, we document that bidding firm announcement returns are higher when independent 
directors have positive prior acquisition experience. These results hold for both an extended 
(1998-2018) and the original Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) sample period (1998-2014). The findings 
from our extension of Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) indicate that bidding firms with CEOs with prior 
M&A experience engage in more value increasing acquisitions. Interestingly, the positive effect of 
CEOs prior acquisition experience on M&A returns exists for negative but not positive prior 
acquisition experience suggesting that CEOs learn from prior acquisition mistakes.  
The findings of this study make a number of contributions. First, we add to earlier literature and 
provide evidence on whether the prior acquisition experience of CEOs enhances or detracts from their 
subsequent acquisition performance, as well as providing evidence on a CEO’s ability to learn from 
prior acquisition experience. Our study also has implications and provides evidence on the importance 
of prior M&A experience. Whilst Harford and Schonlau (2013) argue that board appointments for 
CEOs are made based on acquisition experience regardless of acquisition ability, we find that CEO 
acquisition experience is beneficial for subsequent M&A outcomes irrespective of the profitability of 
prior acquisition experience. Finally, this study extends prior literature examining the impact of CEO 
attributes on acquisition performance and activity (e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2008; Yim 2013; Gong 
and Guo 2014; Jenter and Lewellen 2015).  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the sample selection 
process and outlines the research design. The results of the study are presented in Section 3, 
whilst Section 4 outlines the study’s conclusions. 
2. Sample selection and research design 
2.1 Sample selection 
A sample of US acquisitions is identified for the period 1998 through 2018. Data for M&As is obtained 
from the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company’s (SDC) database. The sample includes 
completed acquisitions of US public, private and subsidiary targets made by US public acquirers. Our 
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analysis is conducted using both the original 1998-2014 sample period in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) 
and an extended sample period from 1998-2018. Buybacks, recapitalisations and exchange offers are 
excluded from the sample. The acquirer must obtain at least 51% of the target’s shares, and financial 
firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4000-4999) are excluded.  
To identify the prior work experience of each CEO and director, we rely on the Execucomp database as 
well as the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) ‘Directors Legacy’ and ISS ‘Directors’ database, to 
identify all other boards on which the director as served. We then use the SDC database to identify all 
acquisitions in the prior ten years conducted by other firms in which the CEO/director has served as 
either an executive or director. M&A transactions beyond those included in our sample are used to 
calculate CEOs’ and directors’ prior M&A experience as we capture acquisition experience for the past 
ten years. As such, mergers and acquisitions from 1988-2018 are included to calculate our experience 
variables. Stock price and returns data is collected using the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and WRDS Event Study, and accounting information from Compustat. After merging the data 
from SDC, ISS, Execucomp, CRSP, and Compustat and excluding any observations with missing 
information, a sample of approximately 1,810 acquisitions completed by 893 firms remain for the main 
tests. 
2.2 Research design 
In our initial tests we replicate the main findings in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017).  The basic research 
design is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with acquiring firm cumulative abnormal returns 
around takeover announcements as the dependent variable (CAR[-1:1]). Abnormal returns are 
measured over a three-day event window centred on the takeover announcement date with standard 
errors clustered by firm. The complete model used is as follows: 
CAR[-1:1] = α+ β1(Total number of prior acquisitions/Percent with acquisition experience) + 
Β2Acquirer characteristics + Β3Deal characteristics + ε             (1)                                                                                   
Following Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) two measures of independent director acquisition experience 
are employed. The first measure is Total number of prior acquisitions calculated as the cumulative 
number of prior acquisitions each director participated in as an executive or director at another firm in 
the prior ten years. The second measure used to capture directors’ board experience is Percent with 
acquisition experience defined as the percentage of independent directors who have participated in at 
least one prior acquisition when serving as an executive or director at another firm during the past ten 
years. We also replicate Field and Mkrtchyan’s (2017) tests of the impact of independent director 
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acquisition quality on acquisition announcement returns. This analysis is conducted by replacing the 
Total number of prior acquisitions/Percent with acquisition experience variables with measures of the 
profitability of prior acquisitions conducted by independent directors.  Firstly, we use Number of prior 
acquisitions with positive CAR/ Number of prior acquisitions with negative CAR, which are 
respectively the cumulative number of prior acquisitions completed by independent directors at another 
firm in the prior ten years, which have positive/negative announcement CARs. Alternatively, we 
employ the variables Percent with positive total CAR/ Percent with negative total CAR which are 
respectively defined as the percentage of independent directors for whom the sum of CARs from all 
prior acquisitions in the prior ten years at other firms are positive/negative. 
To undertake our extension of Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) we construct similar variables to those used 
in the original study for the CEO of acquiring firms. CEO's prior acquisition experience is defined as 
the number of acquisitions conducted by CEOs in the prior ten years at other firms as an independent 
director or executive.  Similarly, CEO's prior acquisitions with positive CAR/ CEO's prior acquisitions 
with negative CAR are measured as the cumulative number of prior acquisitions completed by 
acquiring firm CEOs at another firm in the prior ten years as an independent director or executive, 
which have respectively positive/negative announcement CARs. 
Acquirer and deal characteristics are also included in the regression models as control variables. These 
controls are consistent with those used by Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) and include acquirer 
characteristics: Firm size, Market-to-book, Cash flow, and Leverage; and deal characteristics: Stock 
price run-up, Firm acquisition experience, CEO tenure, Certified insider, Public target, Cash deal, 
Relative deal size, Diversifying acquisition, High-tech deal and Industry M&A activity. The definitions 
of all control variables are presented in Appendix A. 
3. Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics (i.e., mean and median) for the two measures of independent 
director acquisition experience. Similar to Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) the descriptive statistics are 
separated into quintiles based upon prior director acquisition experience at other firms. Panel A 
presents details for Total number of prior acquisitions. In the most experienced quintile (i.e., Quintile 
5), the average board had participated in 13.5 prior acquisitions. This compares with 15 acquisitions in 
Field and Mkrtchyan (2017). In comparison, the least experienced quintile has completed no prior 
acquisitions, and Quintile 3 has completed approximately 4 acquisitions. Panel B shows descriptive 
statistics for the variable Percent with acquisition experience. Once more, the lowest quintile has no 
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independent directors with acquisition experience. The results for the middle and most experienced 
quintiles show respectively boards which have 24% and 66% of independent directors with acquisition 
experience. These figures are similar to the findings in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017), who document 
28% and 61% of directors with acquisition experience over the same quintiles. Untabulated descriptive 
statistics summarising CEOs’ acquisition experience indicates that in Quintile 2, CEOs have 
participated in 1.4 acquisitions on average, while in Quintile 3 and Quintile 4 CEOs have participated 
in 3.6 and 7.3 acquisitions on average, respectively. The mean and median firm size generally increases 
as CEOs’ acquisition experience increases, indicating a strong relation between acquisition experience 
and firm size.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the replication and extension sample partitioned into firms with 
high and low acquisition experience. We define low acquisition experience and high acquisition 
experience following Field and Mkrtchyan (2017). First, as board acquisition experience is correlated 
with firm size, we regress the Total number of prior acquisitions on the log of firm size and log of firm 
size squared. The residual is then used to classify firms as either having ‘low’ acquisition experience or 
‘high’ acquisition experience. Firms are classified as having low acquisition experience if the residual 
is equal to or below the median, and as having high acquisition experience if the residual is above the 
median. This is conducted in order to remove the effect of firm size from the variables of interest, as 
the two variables are correlated. Similar to Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) we document that firms with 
higher prior acquisition experience have significantly greater average announcement returns. Amongst 
the deal characteristics, we find that firms with high acquisition experience are more likely to be 
involved in cash deals and have a significantly higher median transaction value.  These findings 
contrast to Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) who find no significant differences in deal characteristics 
across firms with high and low M&A experience. Acquirers with high M&A experience also have a 
significantly higher market-to book ratio and employ CEOs with longer tenure. These results are 
similar to Field and Mkrtchyan (2017). 
 




Table 3 presents the results from replicating the analysis in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) for both the 
original (column 1) and extended sample (column 2).  Consistent with the results in Field and 
Mkrtchyan (2017) we find a positive and significant coefficient on both the Total number of prior 
acquisitions and Percent with acquisition experience variables across both the original and extended 
sample periods. These findings indicate that independent directors’ acquisition experience at other 
firms is positively associated with acquiring firm announcement returns.1 Amongst the control 
variables, we document that announcement returns are positively associated with acquiring firm 
leverage; cash flow and market-to-book ratio.  We also find that bidding firms’ prior acquisition 
experience is positively associated with announcement returns.  In contrast, bidding firm size, the 
acquisition of public targets; diversifying acquisitions and high-tech deals result in lower acquiring 
firm announcement returns.  The findings on the control variables are consistent with those in Field and 
Mkrtchyan (2017) except for the positive coefficient on the bidding firm’s market-to-book ratio. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
In Table 4 we present the findings from replicating Field and Mkrtchyan’s (2017) tests of the impact of 
the quality of independent directors’ acquisition experience on subsequent M&A performance. Once 
more, we present the results separately using the original and extended sample and document similar 
findings for both samples. Turning firstly to the findings in columns (1) and (3), the results indicate that 
the number of prior acquisitions with positive, but not negative, CAR is significantly associated with 
M&A announcement returns. These results are similar to that in Field and Mkrtchyan’s (2017). 
Columns (3) and (4) show the findings using Percent with positive/negative total CAR as the key test 
variable. Interestingly, our results show that the percent of independent directors with both positive and 
negative experience are associated with higher M&A announcement returns.  These findings contrast 
with the results in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017), as that study only documents a significant effect of 
positive prior M&A CARs. A likely explanation for the difference in results is that Field and 
Mkrtchyan’s (2017) analysis uses an expanded set of governance and director quality and expertise 
                                              
1 We only replicate the main findings presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017). The 
additional findings in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) using additional director experience, director quality and governance 
characteristics as controls are not replicated in this study.  
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variables as controls in their regression. The conclusions from the findings on the acquirer and deal 
characteristic control variables are similar to those displayed in Table 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 5 reports the results from estimating the regression model focusing on the prior acquisition 
experience of the bidding firm’s CEO at other firms. The findings in column (1) indicate that similar to 
the effect for independent directors in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017), CEOs’ prior acquisition experience 
is positively associated with M&A announcement returns.2 In column (2) of Table 5, the CEO 
experience variable is partitioned into positive and negative prior experience. Interestingly, our results 
indicate that negative but not positive prior CEO experience increases M&A announcement returns. 
These findings are counterintuitive as they indicate prior M&A experience is beneficial for subsequent 
M&As even if negative. This effect is consistent with CEOs learning from earlier unprofitable M&As. 
Our findings also potentially explain the beneficial career consequences of both positive and negative 
acquisitions documented in Harford and Schonlau (2013). The findings on the control variables in 
Table 5 are similar to those presented in Table 2.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
4. Conclusions 
This study replicates and extends Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) and contributes to prior literature by 
studying whether CEOs’ prior acquisition experience at other firms is associated with subsequent 
M&A performance. We first confirm the findings in Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) that independent 
director acquisition experience is beneficial for both the original and an extended sample period. 
Moreover, in our extension of Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) we find that prior CEO acquisition 
experience is associated with higher subsequent M&A announcement returns. Interestingly, we find 
evidence that CEOs learn from past negative M&As, as this type of experience is more likely to be 
associated with subsequent higher acquisition announcement returns. 
Our study adds to prior academic literature that examine CEO characteristics which affect merger 
and acquisition performance and activity (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Yim 2013; Gong and Guo 
                                              
2 Additional untabulated tests were conducted including both Number of prior acquisitions and CEO’s prior acquisition 
experience in the same regression, and results are positively significant for both variables of interest, demonstrating the 
robustness of our results. 
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2014; Jenter and Lewellen 2015). For example, prior studies have examined the impact of CEO age 
(Yim, 2013), and overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2008) on takeover outcomes. However, 
at present no research has examined whether prior CEO acquisition experience is associated 
with takeover profitability. This study also adds to earlier research on the effect of prior M&A 
experience (Harford and Schonlau, 2013) on executive careers. As our findings indicate that even 
negative CEO acquisition experience can improve subsequent M&A outcomes, this result may 
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Acquisition experience measures 
This table presents summary statistics for two board acquisition measures using a US sample from 1998–2018. Total number of prior acquisitions is the total number of 
prior acquisitions in which independent directors of the principal firm have participated as either a director or executive of another bidder during the previous ten years. 
Percent with acquisition experience is the percentage of independent directors of the principal firm who have participated in at least one prior acquisition by serving as a 
director or executive of another bidder during the past ten years. Firm size is total assets of the principal firm measured in the fiscal year before the acquisition. Number 
of observations is the number of acquisitions conducted by principal firms. Means for each quintile are presented first, followed by medians in parentheses. In Panel A, 
firms are ranked by Total number of prior acquisitions such that Quintile 1 contains firms whose independent directors have the least acquisition experience and Quintile 
5 contains firms whose independent directors have the most acquisition experience. In Panel B, firms are ranked by Percent with acquisition experience such that 
Quintile 1 contains firms with the highest percentage of directors who have participated in at least one acquisition and Quintile 5 contains firms with the lowest 
percentage of independent directors who have participated in at least one acquisition. 
 
Panel A: mean (median) acquisition experience quintiles as measured by Total number of prior acquisitions 
Quintiles by Total number of  
prior acquisitions 
Least experience --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------> Most experience 
Quintile 1 [0] Quintile 2 [1 – 2] Quintile 3 [3 – 5] Quintile 4 [6 – 9] Quintile 5 [≥ 10] 
Total number of prior acquisitions 0 (0) 1.4 (1) 3.9 (4) 7.3 (7) 13.5 (12) 
Firm size, in millions $2,145 ($904) $3,787 ($1,423) $4,943 ($1,930) $9,024 ($3,277) $11,398 ($2,925) 
Number of observations 528 491 349 276 166 
 
Panel B: mean (median) acquisition experience quintiles as measured by Percent with acquisition experience 
Quintiles by Percent  
with experience 
Least experience --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------> Most experience 
Quintile 1 [0%] Quintile 2 [≤ 20%] Quintile 3 [≤ 33%] Quintile 4 [≤ 50%] Quintile 5 [> 50%] 
Percent with acquisition experience 0% (0%) 14% (14%) 24% (25%) 40% (40%) 66% (65%) 
Firm size, in millions $2,145 ($904) $4,263 ($1,602) $4,168 ($1,477) $8,504 ($2,553) $7,787 ($2,258) 





Summary statistics by acquisition experience 
This table presents firm and deal characteristics, as well as acquisition performance of firms stratified by high and low 
board acquisition experience for a sample of acquisitions from 1998–2018. Board acquisition experience is measured as 
the total number of prior acquisitions outside the principal firm in which independent directors have participated in the 
prior ten years. Because board acquisition experience is correlated with firm size, we regress the Total number of prior 
acquisitions on log of firm size and log of firm size squared, and we use the residual to classify firms into groups with 
high and low acquisition experience. Firms are classified as having Low acquisition experience if the residual is at or 
below the median and as having High acquisition experience if the residual is above the median (results are similar if the 
Percent with experience measure is used). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, 
for differences in means and medians. Differences in means are based on a t-test. Differences in medians are based on 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A 
 
  Replication sample 1998 – 2014 (N = 1,689)  Extended sample 1998 – 2018 (N = 1,800) 
  Low acquisition experience 
 High acquisition 
experience 
 Low acquisition 
experience 
 High acquisition 
experience 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Firm characteristics:            
 Firm size (billions) 4.86 1.16  5.20 1.88***  4.47 1.15  4.75 1.82*** 
 Market-to-book 2.02 1.56  1.87** 1.61  2.03 1.55  1.83** 1.57 
 Leverage 0.15 0.13  0.15 0.13  0.15 0.13  0.15 0.12 
 Stock price run-up 0.11 0.02  0.09 0.02  0.11 0.02  0.09 0.02 
 Firm acquisition 
experience 1.87 1.00 
 1.81 1.00  1.87 1.00  1.78 1.00 
 CEO Tenure 10.92 8.00  10.48 8.00  10.57 8.00  9.27*** 7.00*** 
Deal characteristics:            
 Transaction value 
(billions) 1.13 0.19 
 1.12 0.26***  1.10 0.19  0.98 0.25*** 
 Acquire public target 0.28 0.00  0.29 0.00  0.27 0.00  0.29 0.00 
 Relative deal size 0.27 0.14  0.25 0.13  0.27 0.14  0.25 0.13 
 Cash deal 0.43 0.00  0.57*** 1.00***  0.42 0.00  0.56*** 1.00*** 
Acquisition performance:            







Board acquisition experience and acquirer returns (replication) 
This table tests the relationship between board acquisition experience and acquisition announcement returns by presenting 
estimates from an ordinary least squares estimation for a sample of acquisitions from 1998–2014 and 1998-2018. The 
dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return in percentage points. Total number of prior 
acquisitions is the total number of prior acquisitions in which independent directors of the principal firm have participated 
as either a director or executive of another bidder during the previous ten years. Percent with acquisition experience is the 
percentage of independent directors of the principal firm who have participated in at least one prior acquisition by serving 
as a director or executive of another bidder during the past ten years. Firm size is total assets of the principal firm measured 
in the fiscal year before the acquisition. Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 
1980) and are clustered by firm. * , **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions 
are given in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) 
 Replication sample (1998 – 2014) Extended sample (1998 – 2018) 
Total number of prior acquisitions 0.091** - 0.090** - 
 (2.113)  (2.157)  
Percent with acquisition 
experience 
- 2.403** - 2.489** 
  (2.309)  (2.470) 
Ln (Firm size) -0.374** -0.384*** -0.397*** -0.411*** 
 (-2.471) (-2.591) (-2.785) (-2.941) 
Market-to-book 0.300*** 0.303*** 0.323*** 0.325*** 
 (2.747) (2.770) (2.964) (2.986) 
Cash flow 6.924*** 7.128*** 7.447*** 7.647*** 
 (3.033) (3.143) (3.318) (3.429) 
Leverage 4.872*** 4.951*** 5.096*** 5.161*** 
 (2.725) (2.786) (2.938) (2.994) 
Stock price run-up -0.137 -0.155 -0.149 -0.166 
 (-0.254) (-0.285) (-0.281) (-0.311) 
Firm acquisition experience 0.133* 0.139* 0.127* 0.133* 
 (1.823) (1.912) (1.742) (1.842) 
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.739*** 0.742*** 0.697*** 0.704*** 
 (3.510) (3.536) (3.378) (3.432) 
Certified insider -0.221 -0.222 -0.201 -0.199 
 (-0.579) (-0.588) (-0.540) (-0.541) 
Public target -3.054*** -3.059*** -2.925*** -2.931*** 
 (-6.820) (-6.858) (-6.861) (-6.902) 
Cash deal 1.142*** 1.144*** 1.052*** 1.053*** 
 (3.306) (3.306) (3.118) (3.120) 
Relative deal size 0.264 0.237 0.142 0.124 
 (0.347) (0.314) (0.195) (0.171) 
Diversifying acquisition -1.338*** -1.350*** -1.343*** -1.364*** 
 (-3.503) (-3.539) (-3.708) (-3.765) 
High-tech deal -1.803*** -1.848*** -1.812*** -1.849*** 
 (-2.849) (-2.916) (-2.917) (-2.975) 
Industry M&A activity 3.398 3.213 2.741 2.510 
 (1.012) (0.954) (0.869) (0.789) 
Constant 1.281 1.289 1.460 1.490 
 (0.989) (1.006) (1.183) (1.218) 
Observations 1,685 1,685 1,810 1,810 
Adjusted R2 0.0910 0.0922 0.0888 0.0903 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 




Quality of board acquisition experience and acquirer returns (replication) 
This table tests the relationship between board acquisition experience and acquisition announcement returns by 
presenting estimates from an ordinary least squares estimation for a sample of acquisitions from 1998–2014 and 1998-
2018. The dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return in percentage points. We measure 
the quality of director acquisition experience by decomposing the Total number of prior acquisitions variable into 
Number of prior acquisitions with positive (negative) CAR. We similarly decompose Percent with acquisition experience 
into Percent with positive (negative) total CAR. Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and are clustered by firm. * , **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Replication sample (1998 – 2014) Extended sample (1998 – 2018) 
Number of prior acquisitions with 
positive CAR 
0.177** - 0.155** - 
 (2.191)  (2.062)  
Number of prior acquisitions with 
negative CAR 
0.066 - 0.085 - 
 (0.679)  (0.936)  
Percent with positive total CAR - 5.203*** - 4.995*** 
  (3.577)  (3.673) 
Percent with negative total CAR - 4.223** - 4.261*** 
  (2.493)  (2.630) 
Ln (Firm size) -0.335* -0.329* -0.374** -0.372** 
 (-1.888) (-1.928) (-2.256) (-2.322) 
Market-to-book 0.268 0.244 0.347 0.323 
 (1.186) (1.082) (1.536) (1.441) 
Cash flow 3.125 3.460 4.047 4.401* 
 (1.213) (1.372) (1.620) (1.798) 
Leverage 2.581 2.819 2.894 3.067 
 (1.187) (1.321) (1.390) (1.499) 
Stock price run-up -0.031 -0.044 -0.044 -0.055 
 (-0.047) (-0.068) (-0.069) (-0.085) 
Firm acquisition experience 0.066 0.078 0.069 0.081 
 (0.707) (0.857) (0.758) (0.912) 
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.798*** 0.830*** 0.704*** 0.744*** 
 (3.042) (3.192) (2.780) (2.966) 
Certified insider -0.247 -0.308 -0.202 -0.248 
 (-0.552) (-0.701) (-0.470) (-0.585) 
Public target -3.248*** -3.272*** -3.121*** -3.151*** 
 (-6.188) (-6.273) (-6.329) (-6.441) 
Cash deal 1.528*** 1.544*** 1.348*** 1.353*** 
 (3.729) (3.754) (3.380) (3.386) 
Relative deal size 1.069 1.004 0.964 0.907 
 (1.162) (1.093) (1.087) (1.026) 
Diversifying acquisition -1.516*** -1.545*** -1.514*** -1.553*** 
 (-3.505) (-3.579) (-3.746) (-3.854) 
High-tech deal -2.393*** -2.585*** -2.423*** -2.581*** 
 (-2.992) (-3.213) (-3.142) (-3.340) 
Industry M&A activity 5.753* 5.558* 4.311 3.992 
 (1.900) (1.848) (1.500) (1.352) 
Constant -0.356 -1.039 0.065 -0.586 
 (-0.143) (-0.419) (0.027) (-0.245) 
Observations 1,170 1,170 1,282 1,282 
Adjusted R2 0.0945 0.100 0.0886 0.0947 





CEO’s acquisition experience and acquirer returns (replication with a twist) 
This table tests the relationship between CEO acquisition experience and acquisition announcement returns by 
presenting estimates from an ordinary least squares estimation for a sample of acquisitions from 1998-2018. The 
dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return in percentage points. We measure the quality 
of CEO acquisition experience using CEO’s prior acquisition experience defined as the cumulative number of other 
firms’ acquisitions in which CEOs were involved as an executive or as an independent director in the past ten years. We 
also decompose this variable into the CEO’s prior acquisitions with positive (negative) CAR. Standard errors, presented 
in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and are clustered by firm. * , **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR [-1:1] (in 
percent) 
CAR [-1:1] (in 
percent) 
CEO’s prior acquisition experience 0.224* - 
 (1.772)  
CEO's prior acquisitions with positive CAR - 0.105 
  (0.146) 
CEO's prior acquisitions with negative CAR - 1.469** 
  (2.196) 
Ln (Firm size) -0.317** -0.292* 
 (-2.358) (-1.858) 
Market-to-book 0.325*** 0.363 
 (2.966) (1.581) 
Cash flow 7.563*** 4.120* 
 (3.395) (1.669) 
Leverage 5.005*** 2.701 
 (2.891) (1.298) 
Stock price run-up -0.175 -0.096 
 (-0.327) (-0.149) 
Firm acquisition experience 0.116 0.069 
 (1.616) (0.766) 
Ln (CEO tenure) 0.676*** 0.642** 
 (3.307) (2.564) 
Certified insider -0.278 -0.293 
 (-0.754) (-0.686) 
Public target -2.942*** -3.144*** 
 (-6.843) (-6.340) 
Cash deal 1.077*** 1.400*** 
 (3.185) (3.520) 
Relative deal size 0.124 0.985 
 (0.169) (1.111) 
Diversifying acquisition -1.308*** -1.486*** 
 (-3.624) (-3.677) 
High-tech deal -1.746*** -2.310*** 
 (-2.793) (-2.970) 
Industry M&A activity 2.727 4.227 
 (0.862) (1.459) 
Constant 0.037 -0.207 
 (0.015) (-0.087) 
Observations 1,810 1,282 
Adjusted R2 0.0875 0.0858 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Board/CEO acquisition experience 
Total number of 
prior acquisitions 
Cumulative number of other firms’ acquisitions in which independent directors 
were involved as a manager or as a director in the past ten years. 
Percent with 
acquisition experience 
Number of independent directors who participated in other firms’ acquisitions in 
the past ten years divided by the total number of independent directors. 
Number of prior 
acquisitions with positive 
(negative) CAR 
Cumulative number of other firms’ acquisitions in which independent directors 
were involved as an executive or as a director in the past ten years which generated 
positive (negative) CARs. 
Percent with positive 
(negative) total CAR 
Percent of independent directors for whom the sum of CARs for all prior 
acquisitions in which the director participated during the past ten years outside the 
principal firm is positive (negative). 
CEOs prior acquisition 
experience 
Cumulative number of other firms’ acquisitions in which CEOs were involved 
as an executive or as an independent director in the past ten years. 
CEOs prior acquisitions 
with positive (negative) 
CAR 
Cumulative number of prior acquisitions completed by acquiring firm CEOs at 
another firm in the prior ten years as an independent director or executive, 
which have positive/negative announcement CARs. 
Panel B: Dependent variables  
CAR [-1:1] Three-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) calculated using a 
standard market-adjusted return model, where abnormal return is calculated as the 
difference between a firm return and the value-weighted market (CRSP) index 
return. 
Panel C: Acquirer characteristics 
Firm size Book value of total assets. 
Market-to-book Market value of assets divided over book value of assets. Market value of assets is 
book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. 
Cash flow Operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, income taxes, and 
capital expenditures, scaled by book value of total assets. 
Leverage Book value of debt divided by market value of total assets. 
Stock price run-up Bidder’s buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) during the period (-210,-11). The 
market index is the CRSP value-weighted return. 
Firm acquisition experience Cumulative number of acquisitions conducted by the firm in the past ten years. 
CEO tenure Number of years in the position of CEO. 
Certified insider Indicator variable that equals one if there is at least one non-CEO inside director 
who holds an independent directorship, zero otherwise. 
Panel D: Deal characteristics  
Public target Indicator variable that equals one for public targets, zero otherwise. 
Cash deal Indicator that equals one if financed only by cash and/or liabilities, zero otherwise. 
Relative deal size Deal value, as reported in Thomson One, divided by bidder’s market capitalization, 
measured at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Diversifying acquisition Indicator variable that equals one if bidder and target are not in the same Fama- 
French 48 industry (Fama and French, 1997), zero otherwise. 
High-tech deal Indicator variable that equals one if bidder and target are both from high-tech 
industries as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004), zero otherwise. 
Industry M&A activity The value of all corporate control transactions of $1 million or more reported by 
Thomson One for each prior year and Fama-French 48 industry (Fama and French, 
1997) divided by the total book value of assets of all Compustat firms in the same 










Appendix B. Shark Tank Pitch Template 
 
“Practice makes perfect? The effect of CEO and director experience on acquisition performance” 
Pitcher Team Names  Senior mentor: Martin Bugeja 
(UTS) 
ECRs: Samir Ghannam (UTS) 




G30; G34; J24 Date Completed  30/03/2020 
(A) Working Title  “Practice makes perfect? The effect of CEO and director experience on acquisition performance” 
 
(B) Basic Research Question  The main objective of this study is to replicate and extend Field and Mkrtchyan (2017), who find that independent 
directors with prior M&A experience engage in more value creating M&As. However, in contrast to Field and 
Mkrtchyan (2017) we argue that chief executive officers (i.e., “CEOs”) also play an important role in decision making 
during M&As. Therefore, we also examine whether CEOs’ prior acquisition experience at other firms leads to better 
subsequent acquisition announcement returns. In addition, we argue that independent directors that held positions of 
more responsibility when undertaking prior acquisitions at other firms, such as the CEO, chairperson and lead 
independent director, are likely to have greater influence on future M&A performance relative to other independent 
directors. 
  
(C) Key paper(s)  Target Replication paper: 
Field, L.C. & Mkrtchyan, A. 2017, ‘The effect of director experience on acquisition performance’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 123, no. 3, pp. 488–511. 
 
Other Key Papers: 
Harford, J., & Schonlau, R. J. (2013). Does the director labor market offer ex post settling-up for CEOs? The case of 
acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(1), 18–36. 
 
Yim, S. (2013). The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior. Journal of Financial Economics, 
108(1), 250–273. 
 
(D) Motivation/Puzzle  Independent directors play an important role during M&As, as they are expected to advise and monitor the CEO and 
increase corporate value and efficiency (Bhagat and Black 2002; Schmidt 2015). While the independent directors’ role 
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is vital in the acquisition process to moderate managerial power and attempt to neutralise CEOs’ self-serving motives, 
CEOs also have a crucial role in the M&A process. For instance, the CEO is likely to be the main instigator in the 
initiation and negotiation of M&A deals (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira 2005). Whilst prior literature has established 
that independent directors’ acquisition experience leads to better subsequent acquisition outcomes (Field and 
Mkrtchyan 2017), the effect of a CEO’s prior acquisition experience on their subsequent acquisition performance has 
not been addressed.  
 
Similarly, some independent directors such as the chairperson or lead independent director are generally allocated 
higher responsibilities and are more involved in decision-making within a firm (Lamoreaux, Litov and Mauler 2018; 
Waelchli and Zeller 2013). As such, it is expected that they are more heavily involved in decision making within the 
acquisition process and will gain more knowledge and skills that may be useful in subsequent acquisitions. Therefore, 
we examine whether the presence of independent directors who held the position of CEO, chairperson or lead 
independent director during prior acquisitions at other firms results in better subsequent acquisition performance. 
 
Three core aspects of any empirical research project  
(E) Idea Prior literature demonstrates that prior experience enables individuals to be effective at complex problem solving and 
decision making (McDonald, Westphal and Graebner 2008). Consistent with this idea, Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) find 
that independent directors with prior M&A experience engage in more value creating M&As. However, we argue that 
CEOs are the principal corporate decision makers in a firm and have the most influence in mergers and acquisitions 
(Graham, Harvey and Puri 2013). This is demonstrated through CEOs being less likely to share or delegate decision 
making responsibility in mergers and acquisitions relative to other firm decisions (Graham, Harvey and Puri 2015). 
Strategic decisions such as expanding the firm requires the use of information which is more likely to be possessed by 
the CEO in comparison to other firm members (Harris and Raviv 2005; Graham, Harvey and Puri 2015). Therefore, we 
expect that CEOs’ prior acquisition experience is associated with subsequent acquisition outcomes. This leads to the 
first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with CEOs with acquisition experience engage in better-performing acquisitions. 
 
Prior literature demonstrates that in addition to the CEO, the chairperson and lead independent director hold greater 
responsibilities within a firm in comparison to other directors. As the leader of the board, the chairperson or lead 
director are responsible for overseeing the highest standards of corporate governance within the board, ensuring the 
board of directors fulfils its assigned advising and monitoring obligations, as well as managing processes involved with 
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the CEO and other board members (Jensen 1993). These two positions are also required to limit the CEO’s ability to 
act in self-interest and prevent firm decisions that may conflict with shareholders’ interests (Lamoreaux, Litov and 
Mauler 2018). Specifically, lead independent directors are particularly helpful in focusing the board’s talents and 
wisdom when difficult situations such as mergers and acquisitions arise (Lamoreaux, Litov and Mauler 2018; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2010). Management might also see lead independent directors as having increased 
involvement in the strategic direction of the company, such as engaging in mergers and acquisitions 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2010). Consequently, prior research demonstrates that the chairperson and lead director are 
more likely to take on more responsibility in mergers and acquisition activities than other independent directors. This 
leads to our second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with independent directors who gained prior acquisition experience as the CEO, chairperson or 
lead independent director engage in better-performing subsequent acquisitions. 
 
Prior research identifies that expertise in making acquisitions effectively contributes to a firm’s acquisitions decisions 
(McDonald, Westphal and Grabner 2008; Field and Mkrtchyan 2017). However, prior studies also imply that the 
quality of acquisition experience does matter, as these individuals possess more fully developed capabilities for 
identifying promising acquisitions and avoiding problematic ones (McDonald, Westphal and Graebner 2008). Field and 
Mkrtchyan (2017) indicate that prior M&A performance actually represents directors’ ability, as independent directors 
whose prior acquisition experience is positive generate higher announcement returns. Consequently, as the CEO, the 
chairperson and lead independent director assume more responsibility in relation to an acquisition, we hypothesise the 
following:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with CEOs with better performing prior acquisition experience engage in higher performing 
acquisitions. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with independent directors with better performing prior acquisition experience as the CEO, 
chairperson or lead independent director engage in better-performing acquisitions. 
 
Each of the hypotheses identifies prior acquisition experience at firms other than the firm at which the CEO or director 




Identification strategy: Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) identify that it is possible that CEOs and directors with acquisition 
experience are not randomly allocated to firms, but systematically choose which firms to join. As such, that study 
appropriately addresses the endogeneity threat of non-random firm-director matching through employing an 
instrumental variables approach by estimating regressions in a two-stage least squares framework. Endogeneity could 
also arise due to omitted correlated variables. We attempt to address the omitted correlated variable problem by 
controlling for factors that potentially explain a firm’s acquisition performance beyond CEOs’ and directors’ prior 
acquisition experience, as detailed in Model (1) in Section G. 
 
(F) Data M&A data will be obtained from the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company’s (SDC) database. The BoardEx 
database will be used to identify the corporate governance variables (e.g. board size, board independence, co-option, 
director age, director tenure) for the years 2001-2018, and the ISS Directors’ legacy database has comprehensive 
corporate governance data prior to 2001. Stock price and returns data will be collected using the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) and WRDS Event Study, and accounting information from Compustat. All the data sources are 
available at UTS and no hand collection is required. Observations will be excluded due to missing data. 
 
Our sample of acquisitions will be collected from 1998 through 2018, and will include completed acquisitions of US 
public, private and subsidiary targets made by US public acquirers (100,706 initial observations approximately). This 
time period commences prior to the start of the period for governance data discussed above due to the need to identify 
prior M&A experience. Buybacks, recapitalisations and exchange offers will be excluded from the sample 
(approximately 27,787 observations deleted). The acquirer must obtain at least 51% of the target’s shares, and financial 
firms and utilities will be excluded. After merging the data from BoardEx, Execucomp, CRSP, and Compustat and 
excluding any observations with missing information, a sample of approximately 1,600 firm-years remain. This number 
is based on a sample of acquisitions from 2001-2017 and will be revised once we obtain the ISS Directors’ legacy data, 
as well as updated data for 2018. 
 
(G) Tools The basic research design is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of cumulative abnormal returns around 
takeover announcements as the dependent variable (CAR[-1:1]) with clustering of standard errors by firm. The model 
used in the study is as follows: 
 
CAR[-1:1] = α+ β1(CEO M&A Experience/Total number of prior acquisitions/Percent with acquisition experience) + 





CAR[-1:1] is defined as the acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return in percentage points. 
 
To test whether CEOs’ acquisition experience affects their subsequent acquisition performance, CEO M&A Experience 
is measured as the total number of prior acquisitions in which the CEO of the acquiring firm has participated in at firms 
other than the principal firm during the ten years prior to each acquisition, either as an independent director or 
executive.  
 
To test whether directors who hold the position of CEO, chairperson or lead independent director during their 
involvement in acquisitions have better subsequent acquisition performance, two measures are employed. The first 
measure used is Total number of prior acquisitions and is measured as the cumulative number of prior acquisitions 
each director participated in as the chairperson, lead independent director or CEO at firms other than the principal firm 
during the ten years prior to each acquisition. The second measure used to capture directors’ board experience is 
Percent with acquisition experience, which is the percentage of independent directors who have participated in at least 
one prior acquisition when serving as a chairperson, lead independent director or CEO of another bidder during the past 
ten years.  
 
Acquirer and deal characteristics are also included in the models as control variables. Firm size, market-to-book, cash 
flow, leverage, stock price run-up, firm acquisition experience, CEO tenure, certified insider, public target, cash deal, 
relative deal size, diversifying acquisition, high-tech deal and industry M&A activity are included in the models as 
control variables. The definitions of all control variables can be found in Appendix A of Field and Mkrtchyan’s (2017) 
paper. 
 
Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) employ an instrumental variables approach to address potential endogeneity issues, by 
estimating regressions in a two-stage least squares framework. This approach is still considered acceptable in 
combating self-selection issues. We have the data and skills necessary to replicate this test. 
 
The econometric software relevant to conduct the replication is Stata, which is available to all team members. The team 
have the appropriate skill set and knowledge to implement appropriate statistical and econometric tests. 
 
Two key questions  
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(H) What’s New?  The novelty in the replication we propose to conduct is that it recognises that CEOs, chairs, and lead directors are 
heavily involved in the decision-making process during acquisitions, and thus their prior experience is likely to 
significantly affect subsequent acquisition performance. We also aim to highlight that the experience gained from 
acquisitions may differ based on directors’ responsibility levels. 
 
Prior studies have examined how CEOs’ attributes have an effect on their acquisition performance and outcomes, such 
as age and overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Yim 2013), as well as how CEOs are rewarded in terms of 
post-M&A bonuses, compensation and future directorships (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Harford and Schonlau 2013; 
Yim 2013). However, to date no study has examined whether a CEOs’ prior M&A experience affects subsequent 
acquisition outcomes. In addition, no prior studies have examined whether directors with senior board roles during 
M&As affects subsequent acquisition performance. 
 
Overall, the results of this study will provide evidence as to whether the prior acquisition experience of CEOs, the 
chairperson and lead director enhances or detracts from their subsequent acquisition performance, as well as providing 
evidence on a director’s ability to learn from experience based on their involvement in the process. 
 
(I) So What?  Our study has implications and provides evidence on the importance of prior M&A experience. Currently, as 
demonstrated in prior research, board appointments are made based on acquisition experience, regardless of acquisition 
ability (Harford and Schonlau 2013). However, this view is potentially misguided as we expect to find evidence that 
corroborates Field and Mkrtchyan’s (2017) findings, thus indicating that firms experience better M&A outcomes when 
they hire CEOs and directors based on their acquisition ability, rather than their acquisition experience.  
 
One bottom line  
(J) Contribution Firstly, this study extends prior literature examining the impact CEO attributes have on acquisition performance and 
activity (e.g. Yim 2013; Jenter and Lewellen 2015; Malmendier and Tate 2008; Gong and Guo 2014). Secondly, this 
study complements the existing literature focusing on how director expertise impacts acquisition performance (Huang 
et al 2014; Masulis and Mobbs 2011; Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz 2010). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study to acknowledge that independent directors’ learning surrounding acquisitions may differ according to the levels 
of responsibility assumed by them within a firm. Field and Mkrtchyan’s (2017) study assumes that all independent 
directors gain the same level of experience from engaging in acquisitions, but we argue that the acquisition experience 
gained changes according to a director’s position on the board. Thirdly, this study contributes to research suggesting 
24 
 
that boards with relevant knowledge are associated with superior acquisition outcomes (McDonald, Westphal and 
Graebner 2008; Kroll, Walters and Wright 2008).  
  
(K) Other Considerations  The team have the appropriate skill set to ensure the proposed replication is delivered on time. The data are readily 
accessible to all team members and all have the necessary experience to perform the relevant analysis in a timely 
manner. 
 
 
